History 2
Koh Saeng Tat
- The Opium King
by Carl A Trocki
|
History 2
Koh Saeng Tat
|
|
In the 1870s, Penang merchant, Koh Saeng Tat, began to build a financial empire that marked a true departure from earlier business ventures among Southeast Asian Chinese. His family had been established in Penang since the very beginning of the settlement. He represented the third generation of his lineage in Penang. After developing a network of tin mining and revenue farming concessions in Perak, he took over the opium farms of Penang and became one of the most important figures in the island's financial world. Not satisfied with this very respectable accomplishment, in 1879, he went one step further and became the first outsider to take over the Singapore opium and spirit farms. This was no easy task, since not only was he an outsider, but he faced deeply entrenched competition from the clique of Singapore taukehs who had controlled the local revenues farming concession for over a decade. He had only a few resources. His great wealth and the support of the British government, who saw him as an opportunity to substantially raise the revenues above the low rate being given by the monopolistic clique of Singapore taukehs. From this time until the abolition of the revenue farming system in Malaya, Penang opium syndicates and financiers seemed to dominate the opium farming business not only in Malaya, Siam, Singapore and Sumatra but also in places as far away as Hong Kong, Saigon and in China itself. This paper will seek to outline the role of taukehs such as Koh and to place him in the context of the wider world of Southeast Asian Chinese business in the later nineteenth century. |
|
Koh Saeng Tat and Asian Opium FROM THE TIME OF ITS FOUNDATION, Penang was deeply tied up with the opium trade. Penang and later, Singapore, were founded to service the British opium trade between India and China. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, it was a safe haven for British country traders carrying goods between India and the regions to the east. Indeed, during the decade between 1809 and 1819 (the years before the establishment of Singapore) opium imports and exports constituted about one-third of the annual trade of Penang. (Cowan, 1950, p.86) While opium did not hold this commanding position in Penang's trade throughout the century, its importance declined only gradually. Despite a decline in relative importance, it may be confidently said that it was always a major item of trade throughout the nineteenth century. In addition to its importance as an item of trade, it was also important internally. For all of the Straits Settlements, opium was an important item of local excise revenue. From the time of its foundation until 1910, Penang had an opium farm. This farm had nothing to do with agriculture. Rather, it was a monopoly, which was auctioned on a regular basis, usually every three years. These concessions constituted an important element of the local revenue. As late as 1914, the government monopoly on opium in Penang netted $2,355,204.12, while that of Singapore took in $5,201,684.64. For the three Straits Settlements opium sales totaled: $8,369,505.00, a figure which constituted about two-thirds of the locally collected revenue for the entire colony of British Malay (including the Malay states, Christmas Island and Labuan) or about $14,016,882. (Although the total revenue for the year was over $60 million most of that was from external sources such as investments, interest on loans and similar payments). If we look only at revenue collected from the population, opium constituted not only the largest component of the revenue, but it overwhelmingly dominated government income. |
| Edinburgh
House Koh Saeng Tat was one of the most prominent Chinese of Penang. His family had been in Penang since its foundation. His great grandfather had already been settled in Kedah when Francis Light founded the British colony in 1786, and his grandfather had accompanied Thomas Stamford Raffles to Singapore in 1819 when he founded that settlement. He was noted briefly in Sir Archibald Anson's memoirs as the owner of the house in which the Duke of Edinburgh stayed during his visit to Penang in 1870. 
"On the 10th Dec., 1870, the duke of Edinburgh came to Penang in
H.M.S. Galatea, and I went on board to receive him. I hired a newly-built
house, belonging to a Chinese gentleman, whose grandfather had accompanied
Sir Stamford Raffles to Singapore, when he went there, in 1819, to take
possession of that island. The house had not been occupied.
It has since been named 'Edinburgh House.'" (Anson 1920:292).Elsewhere, Anson again mentions Saeng Tat (again without naming him) as a generous donor to the Penang Free School: "On another occasion, when I wanted to add to the Free School building, a Chinese friend of mine came and said to me 'I don't think the last time the buildings were added to, I gave anything.' I replied, 'I think not.' He then asked what the cost would be, and on my informing him, at once promised the amount of my rough estimate, including desks, forms, etc. He, at once, on my acquainting him that the cost would be greater, agreed to defray the whole of it. This same Chinese gentleman had, on a former occasion, presented candlesticks for the pulpit of the Protestant church. He was the owner of the house occupied by the Duke of Edinburgh on the occasion of the latter's visit to Penang; and I presented him with the bed that had been purchased for, and occupied by, the Duke." (Anson 1920:298) It seems pretty clear that Anson's relationship with Koh Saeng Tat was helpful in the latter securing the Singapore farms in 1879, the time when Anson was Governor of the colony. In his memoirs he mentions a visit to a chandu manufactory of the Johor opium farm and notes that he was also informed about the costs and profits of the farm from the Penang opium farmer. At that time, it was Koh Saeng Tat. " At that time a chest of opium cost 500 dollars (about £100) and the Penang opium farmer informed me that each chest contained 40 balls, which converted into chandoo, would be sold for about 1800 dollars (about £360). The consumption at Penang, at that time, was estimated at from 25 to 27 chests per month, and at Singapore from 45 to 50 chests". |
|
Anson and Koh Saeng Tat Anson has left a discussion of the conditions under which the letting of the Singapore farms for 1880-1882 took place. This, in itself, is a rare document; one can search the Colonial Office records with a fine tooth comb and find nothing of this nature in the official correspondence. For some reason, certain types of information about the farms is almost non-existent, while other sorts of information has been collected and tabulated to an excessive degree. Anson made it clear that he considered this letting of the farms as a particularly memorable accomplishment on his part. It is also clear, that his connection with Koh, was an important factor. Anson wrote: "The custom at Singapore, in connection with letting the Opium Farm, had been to call for tenders for the joint farms of Singapore and Johore, and for these tenders to be opened in the Governor's private office; and for him there to decide which tender to accept; and also what share should be that for the Singapore farm, and what for that of the Sultan of Johore. This seemed to be a very unsatisfactory arrangement, and I determined not to join the two farms when calling for tenders for the Singapore farm; and to let the Sultan of Johor make his own arrangements for his own farm. I was warned, by high authority, that doing this would lead to a great deal of smuggling and great loss to the revenue of the Settlement. However, my arrangement was carried out. The result was an increase in the Singapore revenue of over 550,000 dollars per annum, and the Sultan of Johore also obtained an increase to his revenue". "I may mention that I had received information from a Chinese merchant, well disposed towards me, that the farmers had been receiving too considerable a share of the profits from the farms, in proportion to the amount the Government received." (Anson 1920:365) "Instead of opening the tenders for the farms in my private office, I opened them in public, and on the Council table, in the Legislative Council Chamber, in the presence of the members of my Executive Council, and of the tenderers; and I read out each tender as I opened it. This gave great satisfaction, as the tenderers saw that there was no favoritism, and that each tender had his tender fairly considered." (Anson, p 366) Given Anson's close relationship with Koh Saeng Tat and the fact that Koh submitted the successful tender for the 1880 Singapore farms one may have cause to wonder whether an element of favoritism was operating. It is hard to believe that Anson did not know Koh would be among the bidders. Likewise, the amount for which the farm had been let in the past was a matter of public knowledge. Since the same syndicate of Singapore merchants was the only other competition for the concession, Koh probably had a pretty good idea that a high pre-emptive bid would give him the farms. |
|
In Singapore As things turned out, the next three years were no picnic for Koh. Once having acquired the right to be the farmer, he then had to find a way in which to profitably operate the farms. This would not have been easy, since as a Penang man, he would have had no local organization; no clan group, no secret society connections and no roots in the local economy. The prior syndicate, which has been described as the Great Syndicate, and which had held the Singapore, Johor, Riau and Melaka farms for the past decade was based on its domination of the local plantation economy: pepper and gambier. They controlled access to the labour forces who were among the major consumers of the farm's opium. The syndicate also represented the smaller merchants who owned and operated these plantations and who employed the coolies who smoked the opium. They also controlled the local secret societies and were able to police the farms and control smuggling. (Trocki 1990) Koh and Anson had committed another strategic blunder in splitting the territorial components of the farm. The farms of Singapore and Johor were joined for a reason; as were the Melaka and Riau farms. Whoever owned one of these smaller adjoining farms was in an ideal position to smuggle into the Singapore farm. These farms were of much less value in themselves, but they had a high nuisance value, and if the Singapore farmer did not control them, they could be used to destroy him. In fact, Koh's syndicate was able to either acquire the Johor farms for 1880-1882, or was at least able to reach an agreement with the holders. This agreement however, and the agreement which Koh reached with the members of the former Singapore syndicate: Tan Keng Swee, Lim Kwee Eng, Khoo Thean Poh and others were of little utility for Koh, since his erstwhile partners simply took advantage of their local knowledge to smuggle opium and to damage Koh's interests. When Koh failed to secure the Johor farm on his own in 1882, he seems to have decided to cut his losses, if he really did lose money, and look elsewhere for his fortune. (Trocki 1990:162-172) |
|
Revenue Generators In May 6, 1880, Anson left Singapore and was relieved by Fredrick Weld as Governor. (Anson 1920:371) He went back to Penang as Lt. Gov. He had been in the Straits for 16 years, serving either as Acting Governor or as Lt.Governor based at Penang. In any case, he was no longer around when Koh ran into difficulties with the Singapore opium farms and was in no position to assist him, if he had been so inclined. Koh was a man who apparently understood the ins and outs of revenue farming. He had held the Penang opium and spirit farms prior to taking the Singapore farms and he had also run the farms of Perak. He also owned plantations in Sumatra and certainly had mining concessions on the Peninsula. Koh has been quoted as pointing out the close relationship between the farming system and the indebted state of the coolies. "In 1886 Koh Siang Tat, a wealthy Penang businessman, testified that in East Sumatra, where he had a tobacco plantation, the local gambling farmer set up gaming tables at pay settlements after the tobacco was cut 'and the coolies lose all their money'. One reason for this arrangement, according to Koh, was that 'it helps to keep the coolies there, as they cannot go when in debt'. In the years when the discharge ticket system, which bound workers to their employers as long as they were under advances, was in force, employers in the Malay States probably using gambling as a means of encouraging indebtedness and thus of holding their workforce". (Butcher 1983: 395) [note] Butcher also makes the point that the farms, as they existed in Koh's time and up to the 1890s, at least, were seen, by British officials not only as revenue generators, but also as vehicles for encouraging the development of the country (Butcher 1983: 11-2). So long as opium farmers were the main importers of labour and main financiers of production, they served a number of functions for the government. Once they ceased to involve themselves in mining or planting enterprises, they were less crucial to the development of the colony. |
|
A financier Koh was, I believe, a transitional figure. While he still could be seen as a capitalist who was investing money in productive enterprises, he was also operating as simply a financier. His involvement in Perak and perhaps in Sumatra shows him as an investor. His control of the Penang farms in 1873-1880 suggests he was still tied to the earlier model of revenue farming activity. Michael Godley, who has tried valiantly to find a pattern in the alliances, cliques and conflicts of Penang's revenue farmers has suggested there was an evolution of revenue farming models. In the early years of the British settlement, revenue farmers tended to be, or to need alliances with secret society leaders since they controlled the masses of the labourers. By the middle of the nineteenth century, when the capitalists had come to dominate the secret societies and now controlled their own "muscle" or their own police forces, revenue farmers were capitalists who were investing in the country. By the 1890s, when a high degree of urbanization had taken place and the colonial police forces had become somewhat more effective; revenue farmers tended to be financiers (Godley 1993). Godley points out that Koh Saeng Tat, despite his command of English and his close relationship with figures such as Anson, was also closely connected to more shadowy figures in the Malayan Chinese world. A key backer of his, both in the Penang farms of 1873-1880 and the Krian farms of about the same time, was Khoo Thean Teck, leader of the Toa Pek Kong, the powerful Hokkien secret society which included many of the city's leading merchants. They were allied with the Hai San at this particular time. Khoo Kay Kim has described Khoo Thean Teck as "possibly the most powerful Chinese in Penang" (Khoo 1972: 208). Following Koh Saeng Tat's withdrawal from the Singapore venture, another Penang merchant immediately succeeded him. Chiu Sin Yong was ready to risk the venture. Godley has correctly point out that the consequences of this alliance seem somewhat contradictory. If we go back to the old assumptions, first suggested by M.L. Wynne (Wynne 1941) and later argued by Khoo Kay Kim (Khoo 1972) that there were two durable secret society factions, that showed themselves in the numerous conflicts and wars that took place during the19th century in Malaya, the revenue farm alliances complicate the picture. Khoo, as head of the Toa Pek Kong, was allied with the Hai San. Both were enemies of the Ghee Hin both in the Malay states and in Penang. Wynne suggests the same alliances applied to Singapore. He argued that Tan Kim Cheng, a powerful Singapore taukeh, was allied with the Ghee Hin and that Cheang Hong Lim and Tan Seng Poh, were connected with the Tokong (the local allies of the Toa Pek Kong and the Hai San). If this was the case, why would Koh Saeng Tat (receiving backing from Khoo Thean Poh) attempt to muscle in on Cheang Hong Lim's syndicate in Singapore? Moreover, during the tenure of the next syndicate in Singapore, that of Chiu Sin Yong, again backed by Khoo Thean Poh, we find that none other than Tan Kim Cheng came to their rescue and testified against Cheang Hong Lim and his group. The latter had organized a conspiracy to scuttle Chiu's farming syndicate, and had mobilized all of their allies and affiliates. Tan Kim Cheng's testimony was a godsend for Chiu and Khoo. |
|
Penang taukehs
One interesting point here, is that from 1880 onwards, it seems that there was always, a group of Penang taukehs ready to take on the Singapore farms. The Singapore merchants had apparently learned their lesson and we no longer hear of plots to sabotage the Penang interlopers. In the years between 1880 and 1910, Penang interests dominated no less than seven farming syndicates. (Trocki 1990:151, 192-3) As someone who has spent most of his career studying Singapore, I must admit that I am somewhat puzzled by this tendency for Penang merchants to play such an important role in Singapore's finances during the latter part of the 19th century. Also interesting is the fact that even though we see Singapore capitalist venturing abroad and seeking to control farms in Hong Kong and in Shanghai, and perhaps elsewhere, we do not hear of Singapore interests attempting to dominate the Penang farms. Was it because it would not be worth their while? I still need to find an answer to this question. Beyond this, however, what was it about Penang, and its financial world that gave it such an advantage in Singapore? Singapore was bigger and is usually considered to have been the richer settlement, but how was it that Penang's capitalists could outbid and out-maneuver the Singapore merchants on their home turf? There is one more piece of the puzzle that does not quite fit. While Koh Saeng Tat was making room for Penang capital in Singapore, the Singapore capitalists were as I suggested, looking for greener fields elsewhere. A few months before Koh cast his bid for the Singapore farms, Cheang Hong Lim and a group of Singapore-born Hokkiens from Saigon had teamed up to snatch the Hong Kong opium farm away from the Cantonese syndicates that had dominated them for more than two decades. Was Koh Saeng Tat or any other Penang capitalist involved in this venture? We cannot say, but before matters had concluded a Penang connection did emerge. When the Saigon-Singapore syndicate had pushed its way into Hong Kong and then out-maneuvered the competition by splitting their syndicate and forming a partnership with the deserters, the losers turned to Penang. One of the powerful attractions of the Hong Kong farms was the fact that it had come to control the market in prepared opium for America and Australia. The Cantonese labourers leaving Hong Kong for other parts of the Pacific had a taste for certain brands of Hong Kong opium. When he was stopped from manufacturing opium in Hong Kong, Li Tak-cheong, the head of the defeated syndicate, came to Penang and obtained a license to boil large quantities of cheap opium under the Penang monopolist. With this, he was able to undercut his rivals in the lucrative trans-Pacific market. In fact, in later years, Penang became a popular site for the "outsourcing" of chandu manufacturing from Hong Kong. (Munn 2000:118) Was this Koh Saeng Tat and Khoo Thean Poh coming back around to sabotage Cheang Hong Lim? Who can say? I hope I can find a bit more about it when I go to Hong Kong in a few months. It is clear that the world of 19th century opium farming was one of great complexity. It is, however, only a reflection of the complex web of alliances and animosities and conflicts that existed within the Chinese community of the time. It is clear also that this web of alliances and enemies extended far beyond the borders of Georgetown and even the Straits Settlements, but took in the entire maritime world of the 19th century Chinese. # [Note: Butcher was referring to the subject of this paper - Ed.] |
From a paper "Koh Saeng Tat and the Asian Opium Farming Business " by Carl A. Trocki Professor of Asian Studies, Queensland University of Technology Email c.trocki@qut.edu.au at the Penang history colloquium at Penang 2002 April 19 - 21. Professor Trocki is the author of Prince of Pirates: The Temmenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore 1785-1895; Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore 1800-1910; Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade 1750-1950 [Ed. note: Unfortunately the CD which we have does not give the references to the books referred to. We suggest that those who are interested should contact Prof. Troski at his email address. Koh Siang Tat's name has been variously spelt as Koh Seang Tat and Koh Saeng Tat, as in this paper. He was a sixth generation Penang man. He was born in 1833 and educated at the Penang Free School, and was a municipal commissioner and the Settlement's first justice of the peace. His grandfather was Kapitan China of Kedah. Nothing remains of No 2 Light Street "Edinburgh House", but the fountain next door that the owner donated to the public in 1863 is still functioning. It is close by the 19th century Town Hall at the Esplanade.] |
|
Women's Crisis Centre
34D Jones Road Penang
Counselling for women and children Telephone 228 0342 Website: www.wccpenang.org |
| ______ INDEX Point to the article that you want to read, and CLICK Home Baba Sayings Book Review Ch'a Koay Tiau Clan Jetties Opium King Street Names Table Manners
|
| _____________________ The Penang File Issue 23 |