Page 11
Footprints What the man actually wrote
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Page 11
Footprints What the man actually wrote |
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Victim of geopolitics ... THE MALAYSIAN CASE reiterates how, despite periodic disruption, Al Qaeda operatives can survive in South East Asia's current political and security climate. South East Asian security and intelligence agencies realise that JI has a very high capacity to regenerate new cells rapidly and operate under extremely hostile conditions. After the arrest and detention of Mahamad Iqbal B.A. Rahman (alias Abu Jibril), an Indonesian cleric, by the Malaysian authorities in April 2001, Hambali, another Indonesian but with Malaysian permanent residence, was appointed the operational head of JI's shura. Since December 2001 he has been evading arrest. In many ways Malaysia is a victim of its geopolitics. The tightly regulated political and security environment in Indonesia under Suharto forced Indonesian Islamists who supported the anti-Soviet Afghan campaign to relocate to Malaysia in 1985. Reminiscent of the crackdown on Egyptian Islamists, Indonesian Islamists too found.in Malaysia a tacit host. After JI's founder, Emir Sheikh AbduUah Sungkar, met Osama in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, Jl was incorporated as an associate group of Al Qaeda, one of the earliest in Asia to do so, the other being ASG. Over time Al Qaeda gradually absorbed Jl into its wider structure, just as it had absorbed Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group of Egypt. And just as the Algerian Islamist groups - GIA and GSPC - were co-opted to work forAI Qaeda in Europe, JI members were similarly co-opted in South East Asia. The integration of JI into Al Qaeda's orbit was perhaps due to the doctrinal compatibility of the two. In a rare interview, Sungkar said that the methodology of JI is to realise an Islamic community by the materialisation of QuwwatulAqidah (faith's strength), Quwwatul Ukhuwwah (brotherhood's strength) and Quuwatul Musallaha (military strength). More important, Sungkar regarded these strengths as essential to establish Dawlah lslamiyya (an Islamic state) by means of jihad. "These, among others, form points deemed vital by Jlima'a lslamiyya, whereas other Jama'ah [groups] ignore and generally disregard these strengths," he added. Although the circumstances of the departure of Bashiyar, Sungkar and others from Indonesia in the 1980s and and 1990s were well known to the Malaysian government, they received residence permits and were free to travel around the country, rallying people to their "radical brand of Islam". They initially settled in different parts of Malaysia , but by 1992 Hambali and Muhammad Iqbal had houses next to each other in the town of Sungai Manggis, about 50 miles southwest of Kuala Lumpur. Sungai Manggis is less than 10 miles from the Strait of Malacca, where boats regularly move people in and out of Indonesia without immigration formalities. In 1997 Bashiyar moved into Iqbal's house after Iqbal relocated to another property nearby. After the return to democracy in Indonesia in 1998, Sungkar and Bashiyar returned home. Sungkar died in 1999, and Bashiyar, his lifelong friend and fellow Islamist, assumed the mantle of JI's leadership. Of the clerics Bashiyar was the most vocal, always exhorting the people to join the jihad. Like most radical Asian Islamists, he is of Arab descent, but born in Jombang, Indonesia. He is utterly opposed to compromise: in an interview he expressed his thinking when he said Islam must be sterilized from other ideologies. The specific characteristics differentiate it from other beliefs - although in fact Islam cannot be compared with others because it is perfect. At the same time there is not a single ideology , apart from Islam, which is sterilised from shirk [the ultimate sin in Islam, of associating God with another or suggesting that God has divine partners]. Arguing that there is no Islamic socialism and that Islam is Islam and socialism is socialism, he states: "Islam cannot be democratised, Islam is Islam, democracy is democracy. Each has its own characteristics, and they cannot be amalgamated." |
| The strategist Of the clerics, Hambali was the strategist - he spoke little, stressed secrecy, emphasised training and planned for the long-term war. Although Hambali's name surfaced for the first time in connection with the help he gave the 9/11 hijackers, he also played a key role in operation Bojinka. In June 1994, Hambali founded an Al Qaeda front - Konsojaya Trading Company - in Malaysia together with Wali Khan Amin Shah, a member of the Oplan Bojinka cell led by Ahmed Yousef. According to the Malaysian registry of companies Konsojaya directors included another Afghan, Mehdat Abdul Salam Shabana, who owned the other half of the company's shares, and Hemeid H. Algamdi, described as a 30-year-old Saudi from Jeddah. When Shah escaped from Philippine custody, Hambali provided him a new identity and cover in Malaysia, where he lived on the resort island of Langkawi using the name Osama Turkestani. Furthermore, Hambali was in regular contact with Khalifa, Osama's brother-in-law. Hambali's name surfaced once again as the mastermind of the operation to destroy multiple targets in Singapore 2001/January 2002 On January 5,2000, Al Qaeda's Malaysian cell hosted Khalid-al-Midhar and Nawaq al-Hazmi, two of the 9/11 hijackers, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, another such who failed to gain entrance to the US. The same cell also hosted Tawfiq Bin Atash and Fahad al-Quso, planners of the USS Cole bombing in October 2000. With the arrest of Yazid Suffat, a US educated Malaysian Army captain turned businessman by the Malaysian Special Branch on December 9, 2001, the role of JI's support for Zakarias Moussaoui, the twentieth would-be-hijacker, became known. Malaysia's Al Qaeda experience is instructive. Although it did not toerate Al Qaeda as such, the government failed to take pre-emptive action against its known members and supporters living in Malaysia. Had the Malaysian authorities disrupted Al Qaeda's Kuala Lumpur cell, the USS Cole attack as well as the carnage of 9/11 might have been prevented. The cell hosting those responsible for planning the USS Cole and 9/11 attacks were being monitored by police, even being videotaped by Malaysian surveillance team on January 5, 2000. The information was turned over to the CIA but both governments failed to make arrests. Malaysian Special Branch believed that by continuing to monitor the cell members they would ultimately learn more about their associates in Malaysia. By the time the US Immigration and Naturalisation Service put two of the hijackers on its list of wanted persons on August 21,2001 they had already gained entry to the country KMM also poses a threat to Malaysian and regional security. Although it is an independent group, like MILF or ASG, Al Qaeda works via KMM, another of its associates. Some members of KMM also hold dual memberships of both it and JI. . Nik Adli Nik Aziz, son of the Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS) spiritual leader Nik Aziz Nik Mat, has been named by the Malaysian government as the leader of the KMM. He served in Afghanistan in 1990-6. On August 4, 2001, he was arrested by the Malaysian authorities. KMM was founded by another Afghan veteran Zainon Ismail, on October 12, 1995, and has ties with both terrorist groups and political parties in the region. In addition to its links in Malaysia and Indonesia, KMM cooperates with ASG and MILF. Some forty-five of KMM's estimated sixty-eight members trained in camps in Afghanistan. In addition, KMM trained in Mindanao and procured weapons from Thailand and from the Philippines, most likely from ASG and MILF. KMM members are said to have assassinated a state assembly man, bombed churches and Hindu temples, attacked a police station and robbed banks. KMM's support and operational infrastructure has suffered extensively as a result of its practical and ideological commitment to Al Qaeda's aims and objectives. To build its military capability, the KMM engaged in a series of robberies and in May 2001, two of its members were killed and six captured during an attempted bank robbery near the capital. The intelligence community is divided whether the KMM leadership was unaware of the particular cell's plans to rob banks. In addition to supporting anti-Christian violence in the Moluccas (Muluku), KMM members allegedly conducted terrorist operations in Jakarta. For instance, in September 2001 the Indonesian authorities arrested KMM member Zid Sharati along with twelve other Indonesians and another Malaysian for two bombings in Indonesia. At the time of the arrest, they were undergoing military training at a village in Padeglang, West Java. Zid is an associate of the Malaysian bomber Taufik Abdul Halim, who was seriously injured when the bomb he planted at a Jakarta shopping mall in August 2001 detonated accidentally. After Taufik Abdul Halim was arrested in Indonesia, a second round of arrests of KMM members in Malaysia followed. The Malaysian Foreign Minister said the KMM was planning to attack a US naval vessel during a rest stop in Malaysia but that the plot was uncovered before 9/11. In December 2001 and January 2002 Malaysia arrested a total of 47 suspects linked to Al Qaeda and more are believed to remain at large. |
| Clamp down As in Indonesia, Malaysia is home to many Islamist parties and groups some of which support Al Qaeda's aims and objectives. However, unlike Indonesia, the Malaysian government clamped down on pro-Al Qaeda-Taliban demonstrations, especially after 9/11. If the Islamic melieu is not challenged, more violent groups like Al Maunah will emerge. Al Maunah was a Muslim cult dedicated to overturning the Malaysian government through jihad whose followers believed its leader Muhammad Amin Razali had mystical powers that would protect them from harm; it was smashed by the Malaysian government and later designated as a "terrorist" group by the US government. MILF nurtures and maintains links with several individual members of political parties in Malaysia. With the exception of military co-operation with JI and KMM, MILF's links are ideological and political, with the Movement of the Islamic Unity (APU); Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM); Islamic Front of Malaysia (IFM); Front Islamic Council (FMIC); Kongress Indian Muslim Malaysia (KIMM); Malaysian IslamicYouth Movement (MIYM); Barisan National (BN) and PAS (Parti Islam Se Malaysia). The government of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has alleged that JI is affiliated with PAS, a charge it denies. As Islamist ideology is gathering momentum in Malaysia, so PAS's popularity has grown and it poses a political challenge to other secular parties. In Malaysia, the HQ of PAS displayed two large posters of Osama before 9/11. When asked about them, PAS Central Committee Member, Subky Abdul Latiff replied: "Bin Laden sacrificed all his wealth to fight against communists in Alghanistan, so we are very proud of his commitment. Unlike other people with that kind of riches, he went fighting. So we are proud of him, just for that." The poster's caption read: "We declare jihad on the American government, because they are a country of criminals, ruthless and unjust. If our effort to liberate the Islamic people is regarded as a terrorist act, then to us it is an honour". After the World Trade Centre attacks, PAS disassociated itself from Al Qaeda, the vast majority of Malaysian Muslims being horrified by what had occurred.# Extract from "Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror" by Rohan Gunaratna |
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| ____________________ The Penang File Issue 26 |
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