History
The jungle war
by Commander Ah Hai
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History
The jungle war by Commander Ah Hai |
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The Jungle War (Part 3) In Chapter seven of these memoirs a group comes to join Ah Hai. Chapter eight descibes the tough work of detailed organisation. In Chapter 9 the guerrillas stage their first ambush Chapter 7: More join up at Titi SOMETIME in the middle of January 1942, Negri State Committee members Ah Shan and Ah Tie, led a group of 40 or 50 persons to Titi. This included a District Committee member Dai Huan, the editor of the "Ta Chung News" Ah Kang, cadres from Port Dickson, Bai Mao Guang and Chen Ah Chuan, the Seremban Chung Hua School teachers Mo Liu and Huang Rei Fen, the family of Lau Ah, owner of the "Nine Continents Bookshop" and Wang Wen Po (Note 1) and Xi Kuei (Note 2). The two State Committee members told Ah Hai that, because the Japanese had reached Kuala Lumpur, they were forced to leave with the troops for Titi. They reported that the State Secretary, Comrade Ah Fook, and someone else (Liu She thought it was Zhou Xiao Zhung) had gone to Singapore by bike. Liew Yit Fun, the State Committee member stationed at Tampin, had also gone to Singapore, taking with him some women comrades. Ah Hai introduced Ah Shan and Ah Tie and the group to Zhong Mu and Zhung Guang at the No 1 Base for arrangements to be made.( As mentioned above, if at the time Ah Tie, Ah Shan and Liew Yit Fun had not left their posts and had instead resolutely led the anti-Japanese struggle the two wagon loads of arms at Seremban might have fallen into our hands. Experience teaches that at crucial times the leader of an organisation must defend his posts without fail Chapter 8: A unified command Ah Hai went from the No 2 Base to the No 1 Base to discuss matters with Ah San and Ah Tie. He proposed a meeting of the State Committee and they agreed. A letter was sent by the courier |
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"Old Tigerhead" to Comrade Chen Qun at Kuala Pilah asking him when convenient
to come to No 1 Base for a discussion. Chen Qun replied with a message
via the courier Ah Feng to say that he was too busy and that the mountain
route was not open, adding that his notoriety made it dangerous to travel.
He advised that the three should make a decision in the light of the objective
situation. In the latter part of January 1942, the three called a meeting The agenda was as follows: 1 Approval of the work being done by Ah Hai at Titi and Chen Qun at Kuala Pilah 2 Strengthening the leading organs of the State. 3 The structure and leadership of the Negri anti-Japanese guerilla forces 4 Division of labour in the State Committee 5 Arms, food and production 6 Question of attacks on the Japanese invasion troops 7 Relations with the Liu Shi troops (the "Selangor Company") 8 Refugees 9 Left behind English soldiers who had retreated from Tanjong Malim to Titi 10 Other matters The meeting then decided on the following: 1 Approve and commend Ah Hai and Chen Qun for their good work in Titi and Kuala Pilah respectively 2. Ah San to do the work of secretary until the return of Comrade Ah Fook 3. As regards Negri's leadership and other questions it was decided (a) Negri State to take over from Titi District Committee leadership and command of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war b) In accordance with the decision of the Central Committee, organisation of the guerilla forces was to be under the Party Representative (the Chinese system of "political commissar" was to be abandoned), the Political Department and the Control Department. Ah San was to be Party representative in the Command and troop commander was to be Ah Tie, with Ah Hai and Chen Qun as deputy commanders. The Political Department was to be headed by Lin Zhong Mu. Lau Ho was to be head of the Control Department. The word "battalion" was replaced with "company." Below the company was the platoon. No changes in personnel. 4 Ah San and Ah Tie were to be in charge of the troops of the No1 Base (200 men plus 60 guns). Ah Hai was to be in command of No 2 Base (100 men and 30 guns), retaining his position as secretary and leader of the District Committee, and the Resist Japan Alliance in Titi. Similarly with Chen Qun in Kuala Pilah 5. The main task was to unite the Party, consolidate and expand the bases, rely on the people for good troops and for the Resist Japan Alliance and self defence work. Among the work to be done was the search for weapons to arm the troops for guerrilla war and attacks on the Japanese. |
| The search for weapons left behind by
the British had to rely on the people and in addition we should borrow or
buy guns from those who had them 6. A serious problem was medical. We decided to have apprentices attached to doctors for training. The task was assigned to Dr Chen Chien (Note 3) at No 2 Base and Dr Ye Guang Hui at No 1 Base. In urgent cases a despatch man should be sent to bring the doctor or the patient should be sent to the clinic. At the same time, the usual sources were to be asked to continue with medical supplies. Those needing medical attention increased day by day, not only among the fighters but also among the refugees and the British soldiers. Among the illnesses most feared were typhoid and dysentery. There were many fatal cases ( the writer himself was nearly carried off by severe dysentery. Those who fell ill suffered from sudden rise in temperature and would die within a day or two.) The "Selangor Company's" leader Comrade Liu Shi died from this, crying out in his fevered state. We found his body covered with black spots after he died. Especially after the Japanese army committed large scale massacres and spread some kind of pestilence there was no way we could stop the deaths. We also suffered from malaria but if quinine was taken in time death was avoided. Influenza was also a common illness. Athlete's foot and scabies were common. Although we searched high and low for Western as well as Chinese medicine and collected herbs we did not have enough. It was only with good medicine and better food that things changed for the better 7. It was decided to continue with bringing food from Seremban (we had already stocks for half a year) 8. Production. After a selection process we had cut down the guerrilla force from more than 1000 to six or seven hundred. Although we had six months' supplies, production was important No 1 Base had to use its banana plantation just planted by the people of Eelonglong in a "wotachuk" (a plant which looks like bamboo) area to produce grain. The guerrillas, the resistance alliance and the self-defence units had to take part in this (each day 100 were mobilised to plant wet paddy) with the aim of harvesting in 6 months. (Had it not been for the March 18 Massacre this area would have produced the main food for the No 1 Base as well as the People's Organisation.) No 2 Base organised clearing the jungle and planting 9. Attacks on the Japanese troops. The most pressing question was attack the Japanese Fifth Column and ambush Japanese troops 10. Relations with the "Selangor Company". The State Committee was of opinion that the "Selangor Company" were our comrades in arms and should be treated in that spirit |
| The State Committee
decided that Comrade Liu Shi should become a member of the Negri State
Committee, and that his comrades of area level should be members
of the Titi District Committee. But Liu Shi did not agree. He
thought that his troops were part of the army of the Selangor Party, and
should maintain their independence and return once the mountain route was
reopened. He however said that as a temporary measure Lo Qin, Hu Li
Zhong, Liu Chen Zhou, Chai Tie Feng (originally from Perak and who had followed
Liu Shi to Negri) who were district level cadres should work in the Titi District
Committee The State Committee agreed with Liu Shi and appointments were made as follows: Lo Qin was to be responsible for Titi and its outskirts (Kamloong and Mafong); Hu Li Zhong and Liu Chen Zhou were to be in charge of Sungei Rotan; Chai Tie Feng was to be lead the work at the "Wharf". Comrade Liu Shi asked for arms for the "Selangor Company" but this request was not agreed to because Ah San and Ah Tie did not agree Liu Shi then made the request to Ah Hai. Ah Hai thought that since everyone agreed that the troops were comrades in arms they should be given arms and supplied them with five rifles, two hunting guns from No 2 Base, and from the Self-defence Corp, obtained three shortened rifles (damaged rifles) To solve the problem of food each person was supplied with three gantangs of rice to be supplemented with tapioca and potato. Those who wanted vegetables would have to get it themselves. Quinine was supplied to the clinics To assist the "Selangor Company" to return to Selangor it was decided that Tai Huan lead Miao Siu in trying the Ampang route, and for Zhou Meng to guide a unit to the Broga mountain route (Eventually the "Selangor Troop" did the "Peak" range at Titi along a path led by Zhou Meng, then onwards to the Broga route home) 11. Reception, care and management of refugees . No 1 and No 2 Bases were to expand their refugee centres because of the growing number of refugees who included the old, the young and women. They were to be supplied with the same food and medicine as guerrillas. This was because the refugees were our basic people, some being families of the guerrillas. They feared massacre and rape and we had to help them and look after them. The Bases were to despatch cadres and young people to look after them, particularly the wounded and ill 12. Acceptance of soldiers cut off . The British army were our allies in the resistance to the Japanese army and for humanitarian reasons we had to look after them and their safety. But among these soldiers there were some who were nasty and even attempted to rape the village girls, causing dissatisfaction. We had to warn them that if they continued to be unruly we would have to take to disciplinary action. But some could not stand the hard life and even ran away in twos and threes to surrender to the Japanese, even bringing the Japanese back to attack their compatriots and fellow fighters. However these made up only a small number. Most were good people. There were those who were ill, but never would have surrendered. |
The English soldiers could not get used to the heat of our country and its change of weather. They feared the heat during the day and would walk about naked. They were cold at night and some would huddle together. Although we gave them donated blankets and sacks they still found the exposed attap huts too cold and windy. The mosquitoes, flies and hygiene, poor food and lack of medicine caused many of them to fall ill. They suffered from malaria, colds, influenza, athletes foot, and scabies. Especially high were the casualties at No 1 Base after the Japanese massacre. Among these soldiers were pistols, rifles, hand grenades, and ammunition. We begged them for arms in order to attack the Japanese but they refused for they were more concerned with their own safety. This we could understand but there were some who traded their guns with the locals for chickens and eggs. We took advantage of this to encourage the trade and in this way we were able to obtain weapons such as revolvers as well as hand grenades and rifles. Chapter 9: The first ambush ONE MORNING in January 1942, our information bureau sent a message to say that an armed group - a Fifth Column - of about ten armed men had arrived at the "Bungalow" (the office of a tin dredging company). Ah Hai and the No. 2 Base and leaders of the resistance alliance got together to study the matter. Ai Bing, Ai Ke, Dun Beng and Li An thought that if we did not eliminate this Japanese group which had penetrated our area we would be in danger. We decided to attack the "Bungalow". Thirty were to take part; one group for a frontal assault and another group for an attack from the sides. We had ten rifles, a few hunting guns, and several spears. The time of the attack was to be about 10 at night. The force was to lie in ambush at the side and when the time came to attack the main door. When Dun Beng gave the signal the guns opened up. Return fire came from upstairs. The firing was fierce. We ordered the "enemy" upstairs to stop firing or else we would set fire to the "Bungalow". The firing ceased and the "enemy" opened the door on our orders. Our units joined forces and entered the building. The "enemy" was ordered to lay down their arms which they did. On questioning we discovered that they were a group of British ground personnel of the air force. There were some women among them. They had come from KL to seek refuge at Titi. They had with them some rifles, hunting guns and some .22 rifles left behind by the British. Ai Bing, Dun Beng and Li An apologised to them and explained that they had come into our area armed and without saying "hullo". This had made us think that they were a Japanese Fifth Column. Now that we knew who they were they were welcome to stay. But we would requisition their arms and return them when the Japanese were beaten Thus we were able to obtain two rifles, one .22 rifle, one long barrel hunting gun, and one double barrel hunting gun.. |
| They had two wounded
and we promised to send them to Jelebu where we had established good
relations with the hospital. This incident taught us a lesson, which was to investigate future reports with care to avoid attacking the wrong persons. Our second military action was the ambushing of Japanese soldiers half way along the Titi-Jelebu road. At the end of January 1942 we had reports that the Japanese were coming to Titi-Jelebu in several vehicles. The No 2 Base prepared to ambush them. Ah Hai instructed Dun Beng to call a meeting of those taking part to get them to think as one, act as one and to obey commands. Dun Beng then chose the place of ambush. Our men waited until the afternoon before the Japanese troops were sighted. Dun Beng gave the order to fire and ten guns fired away. The Japanese counter attacked. One comrade threw a hand grenade but it failed to explode. The Japanese were able to break through and fly away Our comrades returned crestfallen, some saying they had hit the Japanese and some saying not. Ah Hai consoled them saying that the score was even for neither had the Japanese hit us. We had no experience of warfare and this was our first lesson, so Ah Hai proposed a meeting in the evening to discuss the lesson of the first battle. The conclusions at the meeting were 1. That the ambush point selected was too high. In future a conveniently high spot was enough; 2. The road selected was straight. In future a winding part should be selected; 3. We had allowed the enemy to come too near. In future we should open fire when they were 100 to 200 metres away, and it was best to concentrate on the drivers; 4. An investigation on the spot revealed that the hand grenade did not explode because its pin had not been pulled. This was due to the tension of the battle. In future the pin was to be pulled when the vehicles were 200 to 300 metres away. In future there would be hand grenade drills. Those who took part in the ambush related how when the enemy drew near their hearts went a-thumping and their ears burned. It was when the guns went off that they woke up to the fight. They were "deafened." Some said the bullets went past their ears with a "pi pi" sound and some said they went past with a "hu hu". A middle aged comrade who had fought with the Red Army in China said that it was the "wa wa" sound that was dangerous. A bullet had made a hole in the felt cap of a cadre, and sliced off a piece of his skin. All this was talk from raw recruits, none of whom had experience of guerrilla warfare. Although we did not do well none were dejected and all hoped to learn from this fight and to do better next time We then decided (1) That all guerrillas including commanders must increase their training, (2) To pay attention to choosing the most favourable position for staging ambushes. |
| Before the establishment
of the Negri guerrilla force the State's armed forces had started
activities to resist the Japanese invasion, for instance, in seizing arms
and ammunition from police stations, opening the Seremban jail to free
the patriotic fighters and innocent persons, distribute anti-Japan
leaflets and to punish traitors and Japanese agents. That is why we could
take immediate action after the guerrilla force was formed to attack the
Japanese forces. We took down the Japanese flag on the government administrative
centre, disrupted communications, opened granaries and did other activities.# Notes (1) Wang Wen Po. Part owner of a bicycle shop at Seremban. Tenor of choir. Recanted when arrested (2) Xi Guei. A dulang washer from Toalang in Perak who drifted down to Selangor then walked to Seremban following Ah San's troops. She married Ah San. She was arrested by the Japanese. She abused the traitor Ah Tie when he humiliated her and the Japanese hanged her. (3) Chen Chien. A doctor. He turned traitor when arrested Go to the top (To be continued) from The War in the South - the story of Negri Sembilan's guerrillas by Shan Ru -hong (Internet edition) First published 2003 Part 2 |
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