Miracleman
MacMichael In Action
And so thc cat is out of the .bag
THE POINTS RAISED BY Capt. Gamnans and the letters
read in the House, of Commons' debate in the 'second reading of the
Straits Settlements (Repeal) Bill on March' 8. 1946 indicate that
the Sultans . themselves, though for reasons of their own, were vehemently
opposed to the Malayan Union. Even in the camp of' reaction there
seems to have been dissension and it is only now that we -have an opportunity
to appreciate the smooth technique of Sir Harold
MacMichael.
In. the debate on the Repeal Bill Mr. Creech-Jones defending
Government accused the Conservative Opposition of making a "great
deal of the letters that nave now come from the Sultans protesting that
their signatures were obtained under some kind of duress.-" "The Sultans."
w.e.nt on Mr. Creech-Jones,'_have thought again, but, when their signatures
were given they had the fullest opportunity to understand precisely
what they were doing ......"
We do not hold a brief for the Conservative Porty in England,
or the Sultans' Party here in Malaya. But, really, Mr. Creech-Jones
could hardly have taken a more unfortunate s t and. Especially,
so, when there was such excellent evidence in the hands of the
Conservative Cap!. Gnmmans. to prove the contrary.
SULTANS NOT UNDER DURESS
Mr. Creech-Jones maintains that the Sultans were not under
duress. Certainly not. It was out of pure, innocent fun that Sir
Harold served that verbal ultimatum on the Sultan of Kedah with a
blunt statement that in the event of his refusing to sign the Agreement
a successor would be appointed who would do so.
It was the same imp of mischief that prompted Sir Harold
to warn the Sultan of Selangor that "it would be best for hin to surrender
his powers io the King," with the ' advice ' "that it would be best
for lite Highness to do so and not prove recalcitrant."
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The negotiations ( it can hardly
be called that) were conducted, in the
most arbitrary, despotic manner. Where the Sultans could
he bludgeoned into surrender Sir Harold,, assisted by the redoubtable
Brigadier Newboult, did not j hesitate to do so. Where some of them had
the guts, to show .resistance, Sir Harold forgot that
he belonged to a nation that had just saved the world
from fascism and adopted methods of coercion that reminded
of Hitlerite diplomacy.
Perhaps the strongest condemnation of the tactics
which Sir Harold used was voiced by the Sultan of Negri Sembilan
that "we (the Sultans) were likewise compelled (under Japanese
rule), to do many things with ªwhich we disagreed under the threat
of unpleasant penalties to ourselves. and, what is more
important, to our people."
When Mr. Creech-J ones claims that the Sultans were
not placei under any duress he forgets that., a. printed explanatory
note', marked 'personal and confidential" was always hranded
across with the Agreement, When the Sultan of Negri Sembilan was
presented with the
Agreement he. was simultaneously handed this "explanatory note."
When the full |impqrt of the Agreement reduced him to impotent
silence Sii Harold seems to have impatiently risen
and calmly announced that he was sending for, the five hereditary
chiefs of Negri Sembilan to be .present on the morrow , when he (the
Sultan) , would., sign the Agreement.
Of the; five chiefs one was an illiterate, old' man who
could not have understood the full; implications of the Agreement;
another was brought from his death-bed; and the third was' a minor
who had deputed al] his power to his sister. These three signed
willingly and the other two under protest.
The Sultan then asked for transport so that he
might see his brothers and consult them. He was curtly told that
this was impossible as neither the
time nor the facilities were available.
The barrister in him made the Sultan fully aware of the
veiled, implication, that what he and his chiefs had
been compelled to do might further be held-against them. A foreboding
fully justified to-day when Mr. Creech-Jones takes
the stand that with all their antagonism
to the Malayan Union the Sultans did sign arid whatever the Opposition
might say their signatures . were there on the
dotted line to back up and sanctify whatever action the Government
might take in the future.
SIGNED AND THAT lS ENOUGH.!
The argument that Mr. . Creech-Jones
forward's that .the Sultans "had the fullest opportunity
to understand precisely what .they
were doing,"' is hardly a feasible one. The Sultan
of Johore says., "that he signed it quite willingly,
firstly, because he was so. happy, and relieved
at the liberation of Malaya from Japarnese occupation,
and secondly,, because he felt confident, that he would. not be
asked. to sign anything that was n ot
in the interests of the Malays.'
He .seems to have signed the Agreement
with the indifference and carelessness, with which we sign a
post-office telegram receipt.
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"It was
only afterwards that thinking the matter over carefully and
lengthily, I came to the conclusion that I had signed
the Agreement without scrutinising it as closely as I should
have done and that I had unfortunately not realised its far-reaching
implications.
It is.worthy. of note., that the Sultan of .Johore
signed the Agreement without consulting the State Council
and as such the Agreement as far.as .Johore at least is
concene'd is null and. void. But these niceties of
legal procedure .do not seem to have bothered Mr, Creeeh-Jones
or his colleagues in the Government, for the Malayan Union is to-day
a reality and Johore is in it as much, as any
other State whether her Sultan's signature is valid
or not.
PUBLIC OPINION IGNORED
Mr Creech-Jonies carefully ignores the
second .issue raised by Capt. Gammans as to whether the Governrnent
can maintain that "apart from the negotiations with the Rulers, the
voice of the people as a whole, as represented in the municipalities,
State Councils, organisations of whatever type, has in fact
been consulted."
It can be categorically stated that from our slight
observation of Sir Harold's methods nothing
could have been further from his mind and practice than to consult
public opinion. Even when the Sultans themselves expressed
a desire: to consult thir own advisers or their State Councils
to gauge public opinion, Sir Harold by tactical manoeuvring
seems to have made this impossible. In Kedah the members of the State
Council were compelled to sign an undertaking that they
would advise the Sultan to sign the Agreement.
When the Perak chiefs came to the
Astana to talk it over with their Sultan the discussion took place
"in the presence of Brigadier Newboult" which alone would
have been a sufficient deterrent to a frank and open discussion
among the chiefs themselves.
In Negri Sembilan the Chiefs seemed to
have been. manoeuvred. against the Sultan. They were inveigled
into signing the Agreement first and then it was presented to
the Sultan almost as a fait accompli.
MODUS OPERANDI
And now to turn to the technique of negotiation
and to the principles of democracy as interpreted by Sir
Harold.
On November 13, 1.945, Sir Harold, accompanied by
Brigadier Newboult and Colonel Calder called on the Sultan of Negri
Sembilan. and placed before him the Agreement
that he was to sign, handing also as a matter of routine
a printed paper marked "personal and confidential.''
In the stunned silence that followed the perusal
of the Agreement, Sir Harold, probably sensing opposition forestalled
it by announcing that he was sending for the five hereditary chiefs
of Negri Sembilan. And that was that.
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The Chiefs signed, the Sultan was
denied both time and transport to consult others and Negri
Sembilan automatically became a state in the Malayan Union.
Selangor was a more lively affair Sir Harold called
on October 23, 1945. After the usual exchange of formalities
Sir Harold broached the subject by asking the Sultan if he
had seen anything about the Malayan Union in the newspapers. The
peculiar thing is that Sir Harold had omitted to notify
personally any of the Sultans of the impending reforms. In-this ease
the Sultan was to have gathered such important information from the newspapers.
After all, forewarned, is forearmed, and it was well that Sir Harold did
not give the Sultans a chance for combined action.
NOT TO BE RECALCITRANT
When the Sultan of Selangor answered that
he had but understood the proposals imperfectly, Sir Harold
threw off his diplomatic gloves ,and, after some rant about the Union's
objective being, for the good.'of the people, calmly told the
Sultan "that it would be best -for him to surrender
his powers to the King." And went on Sir Harold, "I ask your Highness
and other Rulers to give your consent and not be recalcitrant."
This apparently broke the back of the Sultan, for with a
meek "I trust the King nnreservedly" he struck a note
of abdication when he said. "I beg His Majesty and his government
to manage the affairs of my state with justice."
He then put forward his suggestions concerning the
Malayan Union which seems to have reduced Sir Harold to the end
of his diplomatic tether. For he bluntly remarked "that while he would
convey His Highness's views to higher quarters, the sole purpose of
his coming here (to Selangor) was to get the Sultan's signature."
The Sultan of Kedah, probably because he- was the
most "recalcitrant" (to use Sir Harold's word), consequently
came, in for the most ruthless treatment. He was presented, with a verbal
ultimatum with a time limit. If he did not sign a successor
would be appointed who would. State Council members were compelled
to give an undertaking that they would advise the Sultan to sign.
He was told that the matter was personal and confidential
and so according to the
tenets of MacMichaelian democracy
he was not to tell the
people what had taken place. Certainly it was personal.
After all the politieal power of the Sultan
was being transferred to the King. The people were
not directly involved. But why all this secrecy?
And in all this Mr. Creech-Jones cannot
find "any substance in the many points that have
been made presumably against the govern ment that we were trying
in indecent haste to force the decisions out
of the Sultans by methods which were, to say the
least reprehensible ..... . the italks were conducted in a friendly
and frank manner and there was no
uncertainty in the minds of the Sultans
as to what the Governrnent was trying
to obtain."
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TO WHAT
END?
There is little use in rage and recrimination. This
is only to be expected when Malayan political and economic
questions are debated in a parliament three thousand miles away by
people as distantly removed in nature and interest and
who have foisted these reforms on the people on a purely
baseless assumption ((to again Sir Harold's own
words to the Sultan of Selangor) that "if the rulers
do not sign the Agreement there would be no peace in Malaya."
This assumption is fertile food for
thought. Either the Sultans form a trade union among themselves
and hand over their full power to the British Government
to manipulate it for them against the wish of the people for democracy
in this land; or the force of democracy would soon reach heights that
would leave them no place in the country.
And. if you ask Sir Harold was it really necessary to tackle
the Sultans as he did, he will answer; you, like the Shakespearean
scholar that he is, that you sometimes must be cruel to be kind.
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from
"The Democrat"
edited by William Kwok and Jacko Thambo
Vol 1 No. 6 Saturday, April 13,1946.
Price 20 cts
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