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Police Story
by Dato' J J Raj Jr.
This book by Dato. J. J. Raj Jr. is a Malaysian book of value because it deals with Malaysian history in the making. But it is a book about a uniformed policeman whose duty obviously was to be as efficient as possible and not to question why. In that, it is an impeccable account which may also be why it may have escaped the attention of international reviewers since Malaysia stood in the forefront of the struggle between the Eastern and Western forces trying to win the battle for the hearts and minds of the new nationalism of South East Asia. It was a struggle in a bigger landscape than that seen in the Indian or African novels which deal with the emotional conflicts of individuals when East meets West which so fascinates and claims the notice of western book reviewers. It is a story which began some fifty years ago and goes through his history in police service at a time of great political upheavals between conservative and socialist forces, eventually won by the West albeit through Dato Onn, Tengku Abdul Rahman and the UMNO. Though it is already history which may not even interest contemporary historians, nevertheless it did interest me to know if he could shed some light into the real truth as to how this was achieved, even though the real truth may never be known, the reasons can be surmised by the perspicacious historian. I therefore read the book thinking that the author could throw some light on the subject. For example, we know Lai Tek was already a traitor to his cause and was in contact with the British even before the war and that he became a triple agent of the Japanese when he was caught in the surrender in Singapore, and that the Japanese probably knew about Force 136 even as they landed in Malaya. They were sold out to the Japanese even before they could begin their infiltration and the MPAJA was already compromised even as they planned their strategies because Lai Tek was the Secretary-General of the MCP. Lai Tek was an agent for the British till 1947, at the time the author joined the police force, and was exposed by another member of the MCP. The exposure seemed timely as the Emergency was launched in 1948 just as the MCP had lost most of its funds, their leadership who had been exposed, and the British knew of their plans right till 1947 when Lai Tek was exposed and had become too dangerous to hold on to. Are we correct in these assumptions and what happened to the man who exposed him? But the author did not throw any light on such events; his book is an account only of a disciplined officer in the uniformed branch; and he was not another C.C. Too, of the Special Branch. I posed these questions because he himself tried to give a reason for his book when he closes it saying, "After a lifetime of active duty, I sit back and reminisce about the past five decades. Will the colourful past have any effect on the thinking of the future generations of Malaysian?" Indeed, his observation has posed the so often asked question: why does one write? Is it for historical observation or for conclusions to be drawn for those who wish to draw them and for lessons to be learnt for those interested in the development of our society. Unless one is interested in the author per se. Apart from that, the book is interesting to the politician, or would be politician, and the social thinkers and workers about what a successful policeman should be. Good form, proper decorum, codes and discipline which goes towards a trustworthy police officer who would never question his orders but look towards the welfare of the society what has been placed under his charge. When one shoots a communist and kills him it is a job well done as a police officer. But to question if he deserved to be shot and the truth behind the facade and if the end is the justified treatment to be meted out is a matter of justice and right, and that is another matter. One must not forget, the British did try to develop a civil and police service of local people, a process started just before the war. And they did a successful job. There were others such as Ritchie who is mentioned by Raj who was sent to Sarawak. Albert Mah, who became a C.P.O. in Penang and Almeida who became a C.P.O .in Kedah and less successful policemen such as Brodie, all of whom were my friends but none reached his heights or enlightened us about their work. Full credit has to to be given to Raj, especially in his clarity and perspicacity of language. This having been said, I must say that his brief survey of the Japanese period was misleading and I thought he was trying to give a broader account of the war and events thereafter. As it turned out, it was an account of his life as a police officer and descriptions of the political history or events were offshoots of the career of a police officer recruited just after the war when his account springs into a life of its own. He became a probationary police inspector in August 1948 in the year the Emergency was declared. That said, he does not show how Communists became so aggressive at a time when their Secretary-General Lai Tek had been discovered as a treble traitor and had absconded with their millions and betrayed his trusted lieutenants. But he does suggest that the Emergency did not so catch the British by surprise. According to the author, just prior to the Emergency, police strength was 11,288 men which rose to 75,281 men by the end of the Emergency, in addition to 86,000 Auxiliary policemen, all under one Commissioner of Police. It says a great deal for the methodical system and structure and methods of selection and promotion and the due diligence and discipline of methodology of the much maligned British system and their lack of bias in recruitment which we inherited. At that time, Colonel Gray, the then Police Commissioner, in his farewell message to his police personnel referred to the Special Constables, Auxiliary Police, National Servicemen, EPCs, Kampong Guards, Home Guards, Regular Police and Police Administrative and clerical staffs. "Police in the jungles, police in towns, police on estates and mines, police in Kampongs, and resettlement areas, police of staffs and in special branches ....have made the final breaking of the communist threat to Malaya and her peoples." The British had from 1945 to 1948 "had done a splendid job" of completely rehabilitating the depleted police force and, with the military presence of the British army, were already ready to fight back in the Emergency at a time when the Communists were almost in complete disarray when they mounted their offensive leading to the declaration of the Emergency. They had exploited the resources of an entire country against the Communists who they sealed off with their resettlement areas; and it is such little tit bits that we are thankful for. We can now understand why the Communists, with their paucity of supply and training and methods of recruitment stood little chance. So, we know from him, that, far from what we were led to believe, the British were not so caught by surprise and that they were now ready to fight back even if the Communists infuriated the public by inflicting more damage. That was what we have learnt from him about the Emergency and how well and bravely he served during that period. The other interesting period was how Malaysia was strengthened after it was formed. Though he seemed to have nothing to do with "Operation Cold Storage". With the advent of Malaysia, in 1966, Raj was sent to Sarawak on a special mission by Tun Salleh, the then Malaysian IGP, and his job was to recommend steps that should be taken in practical terms to speedily localise the police personnel in Sarawak. It was a trustworthy job, to be executed with utmost secrecy and confidence. This was a feather in his cap if he could come forth with the right recommendation, for implementing his recommendation was the job of the Minister of Home Affairs and the IGP. He succeeded and it was John Ritchie who took over as the first Malaysian IGP in Sarawak. It's these little snippets that make the book most interesting to those interested in the contemporary history of our nation and it discloses nothing that should not be told. But it is not too difficult to read between the lines. But, of course he was a police officer, and a good one at that; and we surmise at our own peril for he discloses nothing that should not be disclosed. For example, on the May 13th incident, he tells us that the Tengku did not know that the funeral procession had been given the green light and that it had been given in spite of police advice to the contrary. The author did not say who gave the order and neither has the Tengku. Normally, the advice of the police is heeded. At that time the Socialist Front was no longer active and had nothing to do with the Elections. The most vociferous opposition was the Gerakan who did not represent or were supposed to have "communist elements" in their ranks. In fact, we know for a fact that the Gerakan leaders did not have control not did they have grass roots. He suggests that the political parties had, in their ranks, bad elements and some were detained. But, the gangsters, if they could instigate and provoke and cause disturbances, they were not capable nor did they have leadership responsibility either; there were political overtones and it was this that upset the apple cart which led to uncontrollable disturbances which required the presence of the army, till then never used in civil affairs, which changed the course of history and prompted the retirement of the Tengku and still we are left no wiser as to who was responsible. He is a wise man and this is a recommended book to read. That is why, in England, the local authorities are run by councillors who do not as a rule, interfere with the expertise or work of the council servants, chosen for their skill and experience and expertise. Councillors, state, local or even federal, are not experts and they are supposed to listen to their experts, whose advise are always examined carefully and thoroughly before any changes are made. It is a book which had to be written and it gives us a clear picture of how the police worked and how they, also, were told what they had to be told. It is unlikely that another book like this would be written. We look forward to a book by C.C. Too before it is too late, for the
sake of our history, as it is highly unlikely that we can experience
another period such as the one we have gone through.
- Book Review by Lim Kean Siew The War Years & After is Published Pelanduk
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Apologies to Machiko Katayama whose name was left out in error in the review of her book The Philosophy of Ikebana (Last issue) |
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