Book Review
Penang button Post 1945 Manoeuvres 



The Colonial Grip

 


The Return


Despite the great loss of ‘face' after their headlong retreat down the Peninsula and their humiliating  surrender to the Japanese in Singapore in 1942, the British returned in 1945 unabashed.  For the colonials nothing had changed; the masters were back and the sooner the natives remembered that the better

We are told by  Lee Cheng Fai, in his book  Force 136, that even while in India the Chinese operators,  who were to be their comrades and collaborators in the dangerous mission being planned - to land by submarine,  found the manner of the old colonial hands rude and offensive.

We saw a display of the typical colonial arrogance  when the leaders of the Malayan Democratic Union,  a political party formed of the English educated to demand Commonwealth status for Malaya was summoned by the British Military Administration. We had issued a statement on police brutality in breaking up a demonstration on the Singapore Padang. Philip Hoalim Sr, John Eber and I (the delegates) were received by Col. Broom in his vast office where he stood silhouetted by the tall windows of the City Hall. We saw only his profile as he stared at the wall and admonished us with "Brigadier McKerron is displeased" before ushering us into the presence of the officer administering the government, now dressed in the resplendent uniform of a Brigadier. After a brief lecture on how wicked it was to defame the police he dismissed us. We were not even offered the courtesy of chairs and were made to stand like naughty schoolboys facing the wrath of the headmaster. When one remembers that Philip Hoalim Sr was a leading lawyer and John Eber a member of the so-called local aristocracy - his mother was English and she was a pal of the chief justice and his wife, the impact of the insult can be imagined.
 
Another incident showed that we had not gone very far forward from 1930.  The British had offered to appoint me a member of the Singapore advisory council. I rejected the offer and asked that the MDU should do the nomination. They would not hear of it.  That way back in the 20s the Straits Chinese British Association, Penang,  was permitted to select its representative to sit on the Municipal Commission was but a forgotten memory.

We were soon to learn that the British had their own agenda. The People's Constitution adopted by the powerful AMCJA-PUTERA coalition  was rejected out of hand. (Michael Stenson in his Occasional Paper on The Communist Revolt in Malaya describes the British response as "intransigent, even aggressive"). Yet this was the document that the British owned Straits Times described as "the first attempt to put Malayan party politics on the plane higher than that of rival racial interests and the first attempt to build a political bridge between the domiciled non-Malay communities and the Malay race"  (September 23, 1947). No discussion of Malaya's future was tolerated until approved locals could be found to "negotiate" with.


Crippled


It was an almost bankrupt Britain that returned to reoccupy Malaya. She was crippled by the second world war;  the sudden withdrawal by the USA of lend lease brought her to her knees. While in this sorry condition she had to arm 100,000 soldiers to fight the Stern, Irgun  and other "terrorist" gangs bombing their way to the establishment of  the state of Israel. Poverty forced her out of India., Palestine and Greece. Labour held grimly on to the remaining money making colonies in Asia and in Africa , imagining their future incorporation into the Commonwealth ( Richard Gott,  in a book review,  LRB 25.4.2002) 

Malaya was the Commonwealth's biggest dollar earner, the other being Kenya, and control had to be maintained.  Cain and Hopkins note that  "coercion tended to be the first resort of policy. The bogey of Communism was invoked , where it was not already present, and this surfaced in the early stages of the Cold War to legitimise the use of force" (Cain and Hopkins: British Imperialism quoted by  Britain's Secret Propaganda War 1948-1977 by Paul Lashmar and James Oliver)

It is not surprising that the British displayed the iron fist soon after re-occupation.  As early as the 22nd of December 1945 British Indian troops in Taiping were ordered to fire on protesters, killing three - the demonstrators  were merely demanding that the Youth League  which had seized rice stocks from the Japanese should continue to be in charge of distribution. In Singapore ten prominent intellectuals were banished.   

The reorganisation of the Japanese police force was a first priority. It was called the "restoration of police morale," strange language suggesting that the Japanese police force had all along belonged to them. (David Watherston former chief secretary Federation of Malaya, in his  Introduction to Anthony Short's In Pursuit of Mountain Rats uses the term "demoralised police force"). All war criminals accused of torture and other unspeakable crimes against humanity, provided they belonged to the pre-war colonial police force, were released and rewarded as "golden boys," selected for training at the Hendon Police School, to graduate as the pioneer batch of Asiatic assistant superintendents of police.

Active jingo colonialists who owned vast rubber and tin interests, such as  Capt. Gammans, came out to dig out the Winstedt "nature's gentleman" clones - the subservient Malay "boy - and organise them against the rebellious modern Mat Kilaus who led powerful organisations such as the Malay Nationalist Party, the Angkatan Pemuda Insaf, Angkatan Wanita Sedar (AWAS), Barisan Tani Malaya, Hizbul Muslimin,  and against the AMCJA-PUTERA coalition headed by Tan Cheng Lock. 

The British Trades Union Council sent in Garrett and Brazier to destroy the general labour union and affiliates.  Garrett was to tell me later that he was ashamed of the role the TUC were playing as an instrument of colonial power. An honest man, his few months in Singapore convinced him that  the Communist led unions truly represented the worker. (The pioneering work of  Dr Leong Yee Fong's  Labour And Trade Unionism in Colonial Malaya:  A Study of the Socio-Economic and  Political Bases of the Malayan Labour movement, 1930 - 1957   which shows that the communists were the only ones who had the guts to lead the trade union movement and thus gain the leadership, now collaborates Garrett's observations. That only brave persons dedicated to a cause could organise labour in a colony is not surprising seeing that conditions were harsh and cruel to the worker.  Eric Lawlor in  Murder on the Verandah has collected a few stories from the newspapers on the treatment of the estate coolie.)  Brazier made no headway and had attracted only the clerks in the offices and the conductor stooges on the estates to form weak and powerless unions. Garrett resigned after a year. Brazier stayed and ended up as government "trade union adviser " in KL.


The Reaction


The relentless crushing of the political associations ("increasingly repressive measures in so far as they concerned radical Malay nationalism" is how Firdaus Haji Abdullah describes it in his Radical Malay Politics ) and the destruction of the  unions resulted in the inevitable, a violent reaction that led to the guerrilla war of 1948 ,  euphemistically called the emergency. The secret  Information Research Department (IRD) quickly got to work to ensure that this was an attempt by the Chinese Communists minority (40 per cent of the population) to impose Communism on the Malay majority ( Lashmar and Oliver, Britain's Secret Propaganda War 1948 - 1977)


It was a war of "burn all". Communities sympathetic to the guerrillas, especially the aboriginal orang asli, were herded into concentration camps, a form of intimidation and punishment tried out in the Boer War. On the civil side KMT strong men like Lau Pak Khuan (KMT and Wah Kee) and Col H S Lee (the rich tin miner who was proud to flaunt  his Chinese KMT Army rank) and Leong Yew Koh, former KMT magistrate in China were recruited to form the MCA with Tan Cheng Lock as the nominal figurehead.

And the unions were smashed. As Dr Leong Yee Fong says  "in June, 1948 the Pan Malayan Federation of Trade Unions and its subsidiaries had been declared unlawful organisations, the trade union movement was placed "in a period of trial  and tribulation" and the "labour movement was reduced to ashes" and until  1949 there were virtually no signs of reactivation".       


But if the British had thought that the "emergency " was a pushover they were to be proved wrong.  By 1953, the real cost of Emergency was something like £100,000,000 per annum - and probably more. In 1954 the High Commissioner gave the approximate cost to Britain of Army Naval and Air Force units engaged in Malaysia of £550,000,000 per annum (Anthony Short:  In Pursuit of Mountain Rats ). The urgent task for Britain to do was to find local elements to whom they could safely hand over safeguarding their stake in rubber and tin and who at the same time could share the burden of the war. For this purpose all "negotiations" were aimed at concocting tempting morsels of "civil rights" with which to enhance the prestige and power of those they had annointed as their successors

To ignore these colonial realities, to ignore the Iron Curtain and the Cold War background, and to write about the post war period as if it was a history of altruistic Britain guiding the different nationalities towards the goal of their own good is, to put it mildly, surprising. How do we explain the post war British policy? The colonial apologists prefer to picture a noble, selfless Britain surrounded by a vicious pack of communists, nationalists, fractious women and naughty boys, treacherous Indonesian agents, fighting nobly to preserve "law and order".


The Truth


Here one is tempted to quote Sir G Tory (British High Commissioner at Kuala Lumpur, speaking in 1963)


"... Here in Malaya we have something like 400 million pounds sterling permanently  invested, mostly in rubber and tin, investments which we cannot withdraw.  This is far greater for example than our corresponding investment in India  and Pakistan. Gold earnings from rubber and tin are, I believe, essential to our balance of payments. Annually some 7 0r 8 million pounds sterling  of new British investment enters Malaya. Our hope of keeping these  investments and of maintaining our present earnings from them depends not  only on the stability of a government which is strong and friendly, a  government which is not, through external or internal weakness, compelled  to compromise with an opposition which is prepared to play along with the  communists ... we and the Malayans have to remind ourselves that we are  going ahead with it because we estimate that failure to secure the  containment of Singapore before the end of this year might result in   Singapore going Communist and starting a chain reaction which could end in  the subversion of the whole region. That is why we are going for Malaysia ... " (27- 29.5 1963  Speech by Sir G  Tory at Eden Hall Singapore)

 The author has not broken new ground with his book and merely follows the path and direction set by those delightfully described by Gore Vidal as "court historians." Thus the author writes: "and the fourth phase witnessed the emergence of the "Malayanisation of the Chinese" policy which aimed at building a united Malayan nation during which Britain also finally committed itself to early decolonisation". The author is pleased  that he had a "great advantage" compared with his predecessors  because "all the relevant confidential files have been opened in the Public Record Office and the Malayan National Archives."

To write a history  based mainly on documents selected for release to the public by the British Public Record Office is an error fatal to the value of such writing, as Professor Aldrich has warned. Government files that are allowed into the public domain are placed  there by the authorities as the result of deliberate decisions. The danger is that those who work only on this controlled material may become something close to official historians, albeit once removed.( Richard J Aldrich: The Hidden Hand )

There are some glaring errors which are a lamentable comment on the research done. For example, if by ‘Lim Ching Ean' and ‘Lim Cheng Yan' the author means Lim Cheng Ean it is astonishing that he does not know that when he walked out of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements in 1932 Lim Cheng Ean also walked out of public affairs.  

And strangely there is no mention of Lau Pak Khuan. Nor is there mention of Khaw Kai Boh,  special branch chief of Singapore and on resignation became a member of  Tengku Abdul Rahman's cabinet  who, while he was an ASP in Ipoh, maintained close contact with Lau Pak Khuan.

Lim Kean Chye

Chinese Politics in Malaya 1942-55
The Dynamics of  British policy
 by Oong Hak Ching
Universiti Kegangsaan Malaysia 2000

The BOOKSHOP , Chow Thye Road, stocks Penang Sketchbook as well as books previously reviewed in The Penang File such as : Tan Sooi Beng: Bangsawan ; Machiko Katayama; The Philosophy of Ikebana ; Dato J J Raj Jr: The War Years and After ; Lim Kean Siew: The Eye Over the Golden Sands ; Lim Kean Siew:  Blood on the Golden Sands ;  Malaysia Nature Society, Penang branch: Nature Trails of Penang Island . Lim Kean Siew:  The Beauty of Chinese Tixing Teapots and the Finer Art of Tea Drinking ; Said Zahari: Dark Clouds at Dawn ; Eric Lawlor ; Friends of the Botonical Gardens: ;  T N Harper: The End of the Empire and the Making of Malaya. 
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The Penang File Issue 22