History
The jungle war (13)
by Commander Ah Hai
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History
The jungle war (13) by Commander Ah Hai |
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The police revolt The second air drop The Japanese ambushed The 2 Independent is reorganised 40 The Police rebellion at Kuala Pilah AT THE MEETING Ah Hai asked Ch'en Chung to briefly talk about the rebellion at the Kuala Pilah Police Station Ch'en Chung said, " I spoke to you about this in October last year. Kuala Pilah's police chief had contacts with us. He and his friends did not like the English colonialists. They had hoped to use the Japanese to gain independence. But these three years showed that the Japanese were worse than the British. They saw that the Japanese were fascists and realised that only by co-operating with us would they have independence and so they decided to work with us" "In May I met Zahid, the police chief (Note 114). We decided that when it was time for a counter attack we would provide the soldiers and Zahid and friends would rebel from their side. We agreed as follows: 1) We would supply 100 men comprising soldiers, Armed Peoples Units, Anti Japanese Self Defence Corps 2) At night we would surround the police station and block all roads 3) ambush positions would be taken at the main Kuala Pilah road All travellers and vehicles would be closely watched. At the sound of firing, all traffic was to be stopped 4) the police chief would summon the police to an emergency assembly; this would be the signal for us to surround them and order them to lay down their arms The police chief would at the same time ask them to rebel (that is that those who wished to do so would join the forces but that those who did not wish to do so could remain behind but should not oppose the uprising) 5) The police chief would himself cut the telephone line and guard those who were unreliable and open the doors of the armoury for the anti-Japanese forces to take arms and ammunition. |
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we prepared our plans to await the moment. The beginning of May the police chief judged that the time had come and put our plan into action First we stopped all traffic on the road, warning vehicles by firing shots and telling them to stop I led the troops to take up positions around the police station sealing all road and their approaches. We went in on hearing the signal from the police chief and surrounded the policemen. The chief ordered his men to lay down their arms and explained that he himself wanted an armed insurrection and to join forces with us. Some policemen responded favourably while others were neutral. As time was pressing we disarmed the policemen and we seized about 80 guns and ammunition from the armoury. We faked a battle in order to fool the enemy and also to give the policemen who remained behind a cover story. Together with the chief and the men who came with us we numbered a hundred and we triumphantly headed for the jungle and our camp. The enemy at first dared not move on hearing the firing and it only after we left and after getting a report from the policemen that they came to the "rescue" The next day all Kuala Pilah was talking about the incident and about how Zahid had gone over to the Anti-Japanese forces. A new chapter had opened in the war Among our troops there was also rejoicing. There was a party to welcome Zahid and his men After he heard out Ch'en Chung, Ah Hai congratulated him on carrying out the Party's policy of resisting Japan and uniting all races. Ah Hai said that seizing 80 weapons was no small matter and the achievement of having Zahid rebelling and joining us in resisting Japan and achieving national liberation was an important event along the long road to our goal. He asked Ch'en Chung to go back and tell Zahid how highly the Party admired his action and to thank him for his contribution to the struggle Ah Hai said to Ch'eng Chung: "Looks as if the guerrilla warfare needs not only flexible strategy but also a coordinated lively united front. Looking back, you and the 2 Independent's attack on the Kuala Pilah Police Station in 1942 had courage without a plan and lost men (plus the fact that the objective situation was not favourable). This time the victory was possible because your wisdom and bravery were fully utilised . It is said that defeat is the mother of victory and that one set back is a gain in wisdom. 41 The Second Air Drop and the Kuala Pilah Ambush Fenner had asked that the troops go to the village of Linkap in the Kuala Pilah hills which he thought was safer for the air drops. When told by Ah Hai about this Ch'en Ch'un agreed to the move. |
At the end of July, Siao She Ke, the deputy commandeer of the New 2 Independent with a company of 100 men including its commander Wu Min and deputy commander Liao Hung Liang and control department chief Teng Yan, escorted Fenner and his men to Lingkap.. It took a few days to get to this place, one day from Kg Jampoh. Spies reported this and the Japanese reserve police immediately prepared 300 - 400 men for wiping out the "bandits" The Japanese move was one which played into our hands. They knew nothing about the jungle and relied on traitors to guide them. In the thick jungle it was not easy to move 300 to 400 men much less to split them into three groups to do an encirclement. We lay in ambush for them We were on high ground They were surrounded by dense cane, attap, and bush and their bullets could not hit what was hidden. When we opened fire they were in a passive position. The enemy realised that they were ambushed and retreated but we opened fire on them and scattered them with hand grenades. Our object was not to engage in battle but to protect the drop so, when they retreated, we recalled our fighters. In this battle our forces were relaxed whereas the enemy suffered severely. We estimated they lost some 10 to 20 men. The Japanese commanders were furious and shot those traitors who had led them into our ambush. In the middle of July, Fenner asked New Delhi for another drop. One night a B25 bomber came over and dropped several parachutes of rifles, revolvers, hand grenades, ammunition, army supplies like uniforms and shoes and socks for our men. They also dropped food supplies like drinks, sugar, biscuits, cigarettes, and tea. They followed with weekly drops of cooking utensils. The food supplies were sufficient for all. They also dropped medical supplies as well money and English pounds The time the drop was not well done. The air crew must have been too tense. Many parachutes missed the target zone and were scattered far and wide, some hanging on trees; some were found after some time by the Peoples Movement who shared them with the Self-Defence Corps, but others were lost. Capson kicked up a row about not having received 100 per cent of the drop and even accused us of stealing. We told him that it was not our fault the plane drop was not accurate and that if he was not satisfied he and his men could go and pick up the drops in future. Fenner acted the good man and said:" What cannot be found cant be helped. But give us what you find" This drop was not as big as the previous one, but the arms were enough to equip two companies. We armed the newly formed 3rd Company and the arms which missed target were given to the Peoples Movement and the Self-Defence Corps After the formation of the 3rd Company, the 1st Company was sent back to Seremban area to be active in Pantai, Desa Sikamat, Temiang, Kg Nanais, Satu, Rahang, Rasah and Port Dickson |
42 The 5th and 7th Companies At the end of July the command of 6 Independent asked the Negri State committee to receive a company of men they were sending to them. Ah Sim was ordered to meet the company. But 6 Independent delayed sending them until August. They were too late because New Delhi having heard that the Japanese would surrender sent no more supplies Also, a part of the company sent by 3 Independent arrived late in August, too late to receive anything from the drops Because of this we took some of the men from the 6 Independent's company and together with men from Anti-Japanese Self Defence Corps in the Bahau area and formed the 5th Company with Chu Ah Kuang as commander and Ch'en Hua as his deputy and with Yi Ming ("Big Devil") in charge of the Control department. This company was to be active in the Bahau, Rompin , Gemas and Ayer Hitam areas With the men sent by 3 Independent as the core, we set up the 7th Company with men from the local Anti-Japanese Self Defence Corps and the Resistance Alliance with Teng Cho Hua as commander and Ch'en Cheng Hua as deputy commander. Area of activity was Tampin, Padang Malacca and around Malacca The reorganisation of the 2 Independent meant that it had added to it 4 new companies (called generally the New Troops and the original 2 companies called the Old Troops, consisting of the Huang Ching Company and the Ai Ke company. In addition there were 200 of the Peoples Movement Armed Forces and 100 of the Self Defence Corps led by the Negri State Committee, not counting smaller units Altogether there were 800 men not including the Self-Defence Corps. (Note 115) .# Notes (114) Zahid. When the Japanese entered Malaya he was an inspector at Kuala Pilah. In May 1945 he led the police in an uprising and joined the 2 Independent. After the Japanese surrender he became the Malay representative on the Negri Resistance Alliance and the person responsible in the Malay Nationalist Party On the eve of the war against Britain he was banished to Johore (115) The strength of the 2 Independent of the Malayan Peoples Anti Japanese Army, excluding the reserve forces and the Resist Japan Self Defence Corps was 800 armed men Go to the top (To be continued) for Part 12 click here |
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| _____________________ The Penang File Issue 54 |