Book Review
Baling talks
Meeting
Chin Peng
|
Book Review
Baling talks
|
| From
Hidup Melayu! WHEN TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN was elected president of UMNO in 1951, the UMNO had graduated from sloganising Hidup Melayu! to calls for self-government. But what about the British rulers of the coiuntry? " The Tunku", writes Prof Nik Anuar' "realised that so long as communist terrorism remained undefeated, the British government would not grant self-government to Malaya". This was made clear by a directive to General Templer, the High Commissioner, in 1951. In truth the British could not give up Malay at all. For one thing, its rubber and tin were earning much needed dollars for the struggling British economy. They had to be sure that the colony was in good hands, fit to ensure that the flow of dollars to the British treasury would continue uninterrupted. The Tunku misread the intent and purpose of British rule. He thought of self-government in abstract terms, that the British would only make him prime minister after the communists and their allies had been defeated in battle. In 1955 he called for an "amnesty" to shorten the transition and furthermore said he would meet Chion Peng adding that it was only to explain the "amnesty". They would not meet him as equals. The British did not like the idea at all. The author tells us that the Tunku met the "director of operations" (an euphemism for General Officer Commanding the War ), General Bourne, to explain that his objective was not so much that Malayan Communist Party) (MCP) would accept the offer but to convince the people of Malaya that everything possible was being done. After elections he could impose a greater degree of mobilisation than was possible under the British government " He fully realised that any direct negotiation with the communists was out of the question." The British disapproval led Tunku to withdraw his offer. . The record shows that the Tunku was not a free agent; that he acted within the directives issued by the British government, in other words, under the control of the director of operations. In June the director of operations committee had a change of heart and it reconsidered the amnesty proposal in the light of the possibility tat the Tunku and the Alliance might gain a majority in the coming elections They did win on 27 July 1955, gaining 51 of the 52 seats in the colonial legislative council. |
| Amnesty In his first public statement after the elections, Tunku repeated his amnesty proposal. After discussion with the director of operations committee it was decided that those who took advantage of the amnesty would not be detained but "investigated." On September 8, 1955 the following amnesty terms were announced: - 1. Those of you who come in and surrender will not be prosecuted for any offence connected with the Emergency, which you have committed under Communist direction, either before this date or in ignorance of this declaration. 2. You may surrender now and to whom you like including to members of the public. 3. There will no general 'cease fire' but the security forces will be on alert to help those who wish to accept this offer and for this purpose local 'cease fire' will be arranged. 4. The Government will conduct investigations on those who surrender. Those who show that they genuinely intent to be loyal to the Government of Malaya and to give up their Communist activities will be helped to regain their normal position in society and be re-united with their families. As regards the remainder, restrictions will have to be placed on their liberty but if any of them wish to go the China their request will be given due consideration. The author records that "some critics in political circles" condemned the amnesty as being" too restrictive and little more than a restatement of the surrender terms which had been in force for a long period." Leading officials of the Labour Party advocated recognition of the MCP as a political organisation. In the MCA and UMNO there were influential elements that negotiation with the MCP would smooth the path to independence The author notes that few took up the amnesty offer. The MCP itself said that the offer was "not reasonable and impracticable" and proposed instead negotiation for a "cease fire and to solve the question of repealing the emergency regulations and of achieving independence by peaceful means." After a discussion with the High Commissioner Tunku announced that the would meet Chin Peng, but only for the purpose of "clarifying to him" the recent declaration of amnesty. In October 1955 the British called for a meeting which included David Marshall, the chief minister of Singapore. The Tunku made it clear that he would not recognise the MCP but that other matters raised by the MCP would be referred to the British. The public feeling on current affairs can be gauged by the fact that the Tunku was constrained to tell British that he intended to do everything in his power to bring the emergency to an end as promised during the election campaign and that if he failed to do that he would be discredited. The Tunku realised that a military solution was not possible The communists in the north were in inaccessible areas and besides, their presence had increased the prosperity of the villages. |
| Report back to Britiish The only way to terminate the war to make reasonable concessions We also learn from this book that Marshall "disliked and deeply distrusted" the Tunku and felt that he had been trapped into agreeing to attend the meeting with Ching Peng; neither did he want to appear to be a stooge for the British. Faced with hostility the Tunku had finally to conceded that he would merely listen to what Ching Peng had to say then report back to the British. When Chen Tien first emerged from the jungle as representative of Chin Peng he was at once told that the purpose of the meeting was to explain amnesty terms and not for negotiations On the propaganda side the High Commissioner announced that the British government "saw no reason to regard the continuance of the emergency at its present level as a obstacle in the Federation's advance towards self government." This was followed by a very strange statement by the Tunku in the Legislative Council debate on 3 December 1955 :- There would be no negotiations for peace as some people apparently believed. It was only after the offer had been made to explain the amnesty terms that some people had voiced the opinion tha the Alliance Government should further negotiate peace. If we do so, it would be an admission of defeat by the Alliance Government should further negotiate peace. If we do so, it would be an admission of defeat by the Alliance Government and admission that the policy of the Communist Party is right. We are not prepared to admit that the Alliance Government had never been in a stronger position than it was today. Our armed forces are carrying the fight into deep jungle. It was, however, the wish of the Alliance Government that there should be no further loss of life or suffering and that is the reason why we are now making an all-out bid to stop further bloodshed by peaceful means. This was a clear statement that the Tunku had adopted the British colonial war as his own It must have fanned British enthusiasm for the man the British had never been quite comfortable with. They had placed their bets on Dato Onn as they did in Singapore on CC Tan and AP Rajah The Tunku, Marshall and Tan Cheng Lock finallymet Chen Ping, Rashi Mydin and Chen Tien at Baling where they talked for a few days . The meeting ended with CP declaring "if you demand our surrender we would prefer to fight to the last man" and the Tunku, "if you do not come out to surrender , we would rather not accept you in our society" After the talks Tunku withdrew the amnesty and declared he would meet Chin Peng only if he came out to surrender "The war must be intensified until one or the other gave in." Chin Peng suggested the conditions for peace would be that members should have freedom to take part in elections and stand as candidates, political and armed members would not be punished. But the Tunku did not respond. After independence in 1957 there was meeting proposed for Kroh but as Chin Peng would not accept "surrender" the meeting did not take place. |
| It was only in 1989
that a peace treaty was signed but only after the government accepted the
formula "lay down arms" instead of insisting on"surrender". It remains to add that the silence of Tan Cheng Lock at Baling remains explained to this day.#. Lim Kean Chye Book reviewed: Tunku Abdul Rahman and his Role in the Baling Talks - A documentary history by Prof Madya Dr Nik Annuar Nik Mahmud Memorial Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Arkib Negara Malaysia The Baling talks |
| _____ INDEX Point to the article that you want to read, and CLICK Index page The Baling meeting Book review Food guide The god in the garden Grandma's garden Letter from Pulau Tikus Malay words from Chinese The mistress of ceremonies
|
| _____________________ The Penang File Issue 39 |