In Chapter s 25 and 26, 2 Independent is ordered
to go to Pahang. Is this a trick by Lai Te? . Chapter
27. 6 Independent is established. Chapter 28. Negri Committee split
into two. Chapter 29: Battles in Negri
Chapter 25 2 Independent
is ordered to leave for West Pahang
In April 1943, Ah Hai received a letter from Lai Te
through Siao Chang and written by Lai Te's secretary Ah Ting (Note
89). The letter said that due to enemy attacks in Negri resulting
in a fluctuating situation and difficulties in food supplies and
many comrades being ill, Central Committee was ordering 2 Independent
to West Pahang, there to join the West Pahang forces and to form the
6 Independent
When he received the letter Ah Hai thought the decision
was not well thought out. With the withdrawal of 2 Independent
the fight would be weakened and the enemy attacks would increase,
the activity of traitors would also increase. What
would be the fate of the anti-Japanese people? How to deal with this
decision?
Central had not understood that the situation in Negri
was not as bad as they thought; nor had they consulted the Negri
State on the situation. But the directive had to be obeyed. Ah
Hai and the Negri comrades had self-respect and courage. At this critical
moment cadres and party members needed clear heads and unity and had to
set an example for the people.
The foreign and local situation favoured us. Although
the enemy attacks were fierce we knew that our difficulties were
temporary and that if we were resolute we would win
Ah Hai in replying to Central said that they would firmly
obey orders. But this did not mean that they agreed with the move,
it merely reflected the lower rank obeying orders. Ah Hai thought
the phrase "there were many enemy attacks and the situation was fluctuating"
was not well thought out. The enemy attacks were frequent in
Titi but in Bahau and Tampin the situation was stable with only one
attack a year; at the most only two attacks were launched and they
were on a small scale, lasting for one day.
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While it was true to say that we had
attacks more severe than in West Pahang we could not compare with
1 Independent who had heavy battles to do. Our food supplies
were not as good as West Pahang's but we were doing better than Selangor
Why did the Central ‘s letter exaggerate? Why did Central
want 2 Independent to leave for West Pahang? These matters needed
some thought.
In the Malayan anti-Japanese fight, Negri was strategically
more important than west Pahang. It was territory through which
the North-South communications must pass. The railway then did not
go through Pahang. If the guerilla forces could take Gemas it would be
equivalent to cutting the transport lines of the Japanese army. The British
also saw its importance; they first dropped parachute supplies and
liaison officers into this area and left Pahang alone
Lt Col Fenner (Note 90) one of the liaison officers,
very much wanted 2 Independent to stand guard at the Negri hills
because from here they could attack the Japanese transport lines. Also
the troops could attack along the coast and aid allied troops in their
landings
It could be seen that the Central (i.e. Lai Te) decision
overlooked the whole situation and was incomplete in its assessment
and rather exaggerated difficulties, a sign of fear of the enemy
In 1946 when Lai Te was exposed as an enemy agent Ah
Hai guessed that the order to move to Pahang was made by
his Japanese boss
Chapter 26 Preparations
In May 1943, Ah Hai and Ma Ting set out for west Pahang
from Bahau following Siao Chang's guides (Ah Tan and xx, - a name
which cannot be recalled.). Ah Tan led them to Triang where there
were 100 guerillas, with only 10 to 20 guns between them. There
we saw Comrade Lau Han (Note 91) again; we had already met him
when he had come with troops to Titi to meet Ah Hai and we were glad to
see him. After two days stay Ah Hai understood the Triang situation. The
political member Chen Siew Sheng told him that the enemy had not in fact
launched any attacks. Their main food was tapioca and thin gruel, vegetables
consisting of kangkong or potato leaves. The troops suffered various diseases
mainly cholera, scabies and athlete's foot
When Ah Hai. heard this he thought that the conditions were
not too different from those in Negri
Two days later the courier Ah Tan led Ah Hai and the others
across the Pahang River in sampans and from a rubber estate they
walked along the road to Manchis and Bentong. In the evening,
west Pahang's commander Comrade Siao Chang came to meet us and treated
us like honoured guests.
Later Ah Hai, Ma Ting and Siao Chang discussed the order
for the 2 Independent to move
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Siao Chang told us about the situation in West Pahang. Here
he said the enemy attacks were relatively few - in fact they were
very few - and were on a small scale and lasted a short while. The
situation was quite stable. The "old fellow" (meaning Lai Te) wants
us to preserve this stability (In fact for a period they observed
this opinion of Lai Te)
As for food generally it was better than in Negri. Farmers
who planted rice had at least one acre of land. Each acre yielded
20 bags of rice. And the good land gave as much as 30 to 40 bags. Manchis
land yield was double that of Negri. The people gave our troops roughly
one tenth of their harvest. So supplies were not a problem but for conservation's
sake the main food was tapioca and sweet potato.
On the organisation side West Pahang did have an organisation
called the "resistance alliance" but they had few weapons
There were two companies and two platoons of guerilla forces
Ah Hai guessed that Lai Te's order for 2 Independent to
move was a trick but Siao Chang had in fact the idea also of asking
Lai Te that the 2 Independent go to west Pahang
Siao Chang asked Ah Hai and Ma Ting what they thought.
Ah Hai said the order had been given and they must obey
it.
Siao Chang asked what would happen to the Negri people.
Ah Hai said there would be difficulties and they would have to leave
some guns and bullets behind. After a discussion Siao Chang and Ma Ting
agreed to leave behind more than ten rifles, hunting guns and ammunition,
enough for a squad.
After the discussion of the 2 Independent's move,
Siao Chang and Ma Ting proposed to Ah Hai that the 6 Independent
send a squad to Titi to liquidate enemy agents. Ah Hai agreed. But the
squad was not effective because when they got to Titi the enemy agents
fled and returned only when they left.
Chapter 27 6 Independent is established
At the end of May, Ah Hai and Ma Ting returned to the forest
by the Malay village at Kongkoi Kenaboi which was the base
of the 2 Independent. There they reported what the three had decided in
regard to the Central's decision
Ah Hai remained for one week with 2 Independent explaining to
Party members the meaning of the Central's order. Comrades, especially
those from Titi, asked what if they left and the enemy slaughtered
the masses, including their families? What if the enemy agents sought revenge?
Ah Hai had to explain that orders must be obeyed, and that if the people
were attacked the local Party organisations must organise resistance
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After leaving
2 Independent Ah Hai went to the "Wharf" and called a meeting of
the District Committee. At the meeting were Siao Liu, head of
organisation, Chung Kwang and She Ke, propaganda chief. As expected, the
announcement that Ah Hai made caused astonishment, all saying that the
order was unbelievable. Nevertheless Ah Hai discussed with them the arrangements
for work to be done after their departure.
Following that Ah Hai called a meeting of all Party members
of Titi. The result was an upset, causing a loss of confidence. If
they had known they said they would not have merged with 2 Independent.
What was needed at this crucial moment was to strengthen the
comrades' revolutionary standpoint, their organisational strength and
their resoluteness in pursuing the fight against Japan. Ah Hai told
them that the order must be obeyed but they should discuss what to do
after 2 Independent had withdrawn. He said that all must uphold
the honour and history of the Negri organisation, that if we persisted
in the struggle we would grow in strength again. What was important was
to maintain one's courage. Ah Hai reminded them that they had started with
nothing but that broadening the struggle had resulted in more than 1000
signing up for the guerilla forces when they had only two guns; but "there
is nothing difficult in the world and we fear only the faint hearted" and
that by the end of 1941 the guerilla forces were ready
District had to obey the Central Committee and merge the Negri
guerilla forces with the 2 Independent which mean a reduction of cadres
and arms in the people's movement. Ah Hai told them that if they look
only on the pessimistic side they would lose hope. He asked them to keep
up their spirits and struggle until victory. He analysed home and foreign
events and told them that light was already appearing in the anti-fascist
struggle. From August 23, 1942 to October 9,
the German fascists used immense forces against Stalingrad. If they had
taken Stalingrad they would have moved to the western front and attacked
the British middle East colonies and reached out to their Japanese allies.
But Stalingrad smashed the Hitler advance. This forced Hitler into a strategic
defence and the Soviet forces changed to a strategic advance. This half
year saw victory after victory for the Red Army. On the western front the
British and Americans had opened the second front. The Allied Army fighting
against the Japanese who had seized the British and French colonies were
getting stronger. In China the Japanese invaders too were forced into a
strategic defence. The Chinese anti-Japanese war especially that led by
the Chinese Communist Party had turned into a strategic offensive.
The 8th Route Army, the New 4th Army and the guerilla forces at the rear
of the enemy were growing and winning victories
Here, the forces led by the Communist Party too were getting
stronger and holding the Japanese bandits in check
Ah Hai said that there was no doubt that with the move
of the 2 Independent the local forces would be weakened, this created
difficulties. But the international and local situation was improving
and the enemy and their agents could not long sustain their attacks on
us. The local forces were developing and work among the Malays was growing;
this was the positive side. We could see that difficulties were temporary
while day by day the situation favoured us.
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Ah Hai asked that they resolutely continue
the struggle, following the policies of the Party and its experience,
develop guerrilla war, oppose blind rashness, fear and running away,
and be alert and avoid betraying the revolution. Cadres especially must
have a stand on issues and resolve problems with the objective situation
in mind. Unite against the enemy and smash his attacks and develop
guerilla warfare and the mass movement
Each area had its weapons. Where possible, apart from
eliminating agents, they would ambush small groups of the enemy by
combining the armed peoples movement for each operation
They could also take advantage of the enemy not being aware
of the Malay villages being sympathetic to us by working more with
them
As for turncoats we would have no mercy on those who were all
out to serve the enemy, such as Hwang Tong Aun and Ah Tie. To those
who were keen to come back and were not ferociously serving their masters
we must give them a chance as was given to Ah Li.
Ah Hai pointed out that the enemy were starting to be unsettled
and break up and we should take advantage and turn what was not favourable
into an advantage for us
Ah Hai asked for comments The answers were (1) that they would
obey orders but the reasons were unconvincing; (2) they would rally round
the Party and carry out State's directive and continue the struggle
Ah Hai then went on to Pertang, Bahau, and Tampin and
summoned meetings of District Committees to inform them of Central's
orders and urged them to continue the struggle. The attitude of the Pertang
comrades was the same as those of Titi. They said they would set
up a platoon of Negri Anti Japanese guerillas and grow from no guns to
hundreds of guns. At present Negri added up had several guns and
their arms would grow from there. All sang revolutionary songs, which
showed the fighting spirit of Pertang
Bahau and Tampin (both had combined to form one District Committee)
praised the attitude of the Pertang cadres and said that they too would
carry on the struggle
When Ch'en Ch'un heard of the order he came to Ah Hai and he
said he would return to Negri. Ah Hai welcomed the old fighter's
contribution.
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In June 1943, 2 Independent completed
the move to west Pahang and set up the Malayan People's 6 Independent
Troop. Siao Chang was the political representative and Ma Ting the commander
with Chen Hao as deputy commander
Chapter 28 The NegriCommittee split into two
In June 1943, Siao Chang received another order from Central by
Lai Te written by Ah Ting and inscribed "Central Committee". The letter
said that the situation in Negri was fluid and communications among
the State committees was difficult. From now on the State would be split
into two: The Federal highway was to be the border and the Special North
East Area would be led by Ah Hai as secretary and the Southwest Special
Area would have Ah Chuan as secretary
Ah Hai replied that he would act accordingly and appoint Titi's
District's secretary Siao Liu and Pertang's secretary Ah Shen as
members of the Northeast Committee. Work would be divided as follows:
Secretary, Ah Hai, organisation chief, Siao Liu, propaganda, Ah Shen .
Siao Liu would as before lead the Titi area and liaise with the Seremban
anti-Japanese organisation. Ah Shen would as before lead the Pertang area.
Apart from the routine daily work they must specially consolidate the
Seremban hills Malay village work and actively develop Malay village work
along the Kuala Pilah-Seremban road. Ah Hai was to directly lead
Bahau and Tampin Party organisations which, apart from their daily chores,
were to consolidate work in Rompin, Gemas and develop Padang Melaka. In
the Tampin district to rely on the Kota, Rantau and Rembau
mass organisations to develop work along the Seremban - Port Dickson border.
(Because Ah Chuang was seriously ill the Port Dickson organisation was weak
and they could not liaise with Tampin and Seremban for mass work)
In other words, Ah Hai, while carrying out the order to split
Negri into two special committees, did not in fact use the Federal highway
as a divider because this simply could not be done
From June to August 1943 although the Negri mass organisation
was upset by the shift of 2 Independent to Pahang the district and area
committees were steadfast and comrades continued with their work.
Chapter 29 Battles in Negri
After 2 Independent
had gone, the battle in Negri intensified. As expected, the enemy
intensified their attacks both politically and militarily. Led by
the Special Committees the Negri Party organisations fought back and gained
some victories. But at the same time they lost some valuable cadre comrades
There was in
Pertang a sharpshooter, Chang Sheng, who used to work in an oil palm
estate and who never missed a single shot hunting rats Another was
Ah Ching who was very good at wild boar hunting. Because they were
good shots, we sent them to lead a team of five men to ambush a
puppet police patrol. In the first ambush they shot one dead and another
ran away, They recovered two rifles. This resulted in fear among the
puppet police who, on hearing that Chang Sheng was in the force, did not
dare enter the villages, confining themselves instead to the road
From June to
July that year, during the Japanese enemy's attack on the camp of the
Ladang Geddes People's Movement, Comrade Ah Sheng was slightly wounded
in the head. During the July-August period a comrade of Pertang was ambushed
and seriously wounded and died of his wounds
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Our losses included
Ah Poh, also known as Ah Yu. He was the commander of the Titi Armed Peoples
Movement. He fought well when we ambushed an enemy patrol but at Sungei
Rotan our troops were ambushed by superior enemy forces and Ah Yu
was killed when providing cover for our troops to withdraw. We also lost
Titi's District organisation chief, Chung Kwang. There was a traitor
in the organisation who betrayed the group. One early morning the enemy
surrounded the base. We were forced to retreat when they opened fire The
enemy had more than ten experienced solders and Chung Kwang gave orders to
retreat in face of a superior force. He gave cover to his men to retreat
and fought to the last bullet. It was a great loss to the District. However
the enemy too suffered losses though the actual figures are not known to
us
The Tampin Armed
People's Movement led by Lin Chung was successful in killing and wounding
many of the enemy patrols because they took the initiative in opening
fire first, then withdrawing
We were aware,
however, that our difficulties were but temporary. Traitors were
confined to individual units. It was only Chung Kwang's unit which discovered
a traitor; in other units a few wavering elements were discovered but
after a few educational talks they rallied.
Comrades were
not upset by the losses; on the other hand, they were more determined
than ever to avenge the deaths of their comrades. The Negri Northeast Special
Area comrades had good results from their mass work. We had support
and encouragement from Pahang, Selangor and Johore North. Also 6 Independent
sent an extermination squad back to Titi to deal with traitors.
Notes:
(89) Ya Ting. Wrote documents for Lai Te in the middle period
of the war against Japanese aggression and was his personal secretary
for correspondence. Towards the end of the war he was propaganda
chief of the Selangor state committee. He was killed during an enemy
attack
(90) Lt Col Fenner. Chief of Liaison with the 2 Independent
sent by the South East Asia Headquarters of the Allied Command. After
1957, was the Inspector General of Police
(91) Lau Han . Secretary of the Pahang state committee.
He died fighting the British in Pahang.
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(To be continued)
Part
7
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